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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study the relationship among schooling, youth employment
and youth crime. The framework, a multinomial discrete choice vector autore-
gression, provides a comprehensive analysis of the dynamic interactions among
a youth￿ s schooling, work and crime decisions and arrest and incarceration out-
comes. We allow for observable initial conditions, unobserved heterogeneity,
measurement error and missing data. We use data from the NLSY97 on black
male youths starting from age 14. The estimates indicate important roles both
for heterogeneity in initial conditions and for stochastic events that arise during
one￿ s youth in determining outcomes as young adults.
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As of June 30, 2007, 9.7 percent of black males between the ages of 20 and 24 were inmates
held in state or federal prisons or in local jails (U.S. Department of Justice (2008)). Even
more striking is the fact that, in 1995, one-third of black men between the ages of 20 and 29
were either incarcerated, on probation or on parole (Mauer (1995)). While statistics of this
kind are often contrasted to those of white males of the same ages, for whom incarceration
rates are substantially smaller (e.g., Freeman (1992)), a perhaps more apt contrast is to the
majority of black males who do not become involved in the criminal justice system.1 What
is di⁄erent about the 10 percent of the 20-24 year old black males who were incarcerated as
opposed to the 90 percent who were not, or the one-third of 20-29 year old black men who
had been incarcerated, on probation or on parole at some point in their lives as opposed to
the two-thirds who had not?
Table 1, based on data from the 1997 youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys
(NLSY97), shows the relationship between incarceration rates of young adult black males
age 19 to 22 and a number of juvenile behaviors and family background characteristics.2 In
terms of prior behaviors, the largest di⁄erence in incarceration rates arises between black
male youths who did not attend school at age 16, who account for 22.8 percent of the 16 year
olds, and those who did. Non-attenders are 4 times more likely to be incarcerated at ages
19 to 22. Working at age 16 while attending school is associated with a lower incarceration
rate at ages 19 to 22 and committing a crime at age 14 with a greater incarceration rate,
but the di⁄erences are small and not precise.3 With respect to background characteristics, a
youth whose mother is a high school dropout is 88 percent more likely to be incarcerated at
ages 19 to 22, a youth who was born to a teen mother is 78 percent more likely and a youth
who has always lived with both biological parents is 34 percent less likely.
Table 1 also shows the relationship between those same juvenile behaviors and family
background characteristics and several other young adult outcomes. Attending school at age
1As of June 30, 2007, only 1.6 percent of white males between the ages of 20 and 24 were incarcerated
(U.S. Department of Justice (2008)).
2We describe the data in detail in Section V below.
3By precise, we mean that the 95 percent con￿dence interval shown in table 1 does not include zero.
116 is not only associated with lower incarceration rates, but the 16 year olds that attend
school also have a lower crime rate at ages 19 to 22, by 12.2 percentage points, a lower
arrest rate, by 15.5 percentage points, and a high school graduation rate that is about 12
times greater. Among the other variables, the largest di⁄erences are associated with having
committed a crime at age 14. In particular, youths that committed a crime at age 14 are
twice as likely to commit a crime at ages 19 to 22 as those that did not, are 10.3 percentage
points more likely to be arrested and are 19 times less likely to graduate from high school.
The relationship between background characteristics and both young adult crime and arrest
rates is generally small and not precisely determined. However, having a mother who did not
graduate from high school or who was a teen at the youth￿ s birth is associated with lower
youth graduation rates, by 28.4 and 12.5 percentage points.
The relationships among schooling, youth employment and youth crime, as depicted in
table 1, have long been of interest to social scientists. In particular, empirical research in
economics, psychology and sociology/criminology has focused attention on three main issues,
identi￿ed with three distinct literatures. The ￿rst issue concerns the relationship between
education and crime. More recent contributions by economists to this literature include
Lochner and Moretti (2004), who estimate the e⁄ect of school attainment on participation
in criminal activity, Jacob and Lefgren (2003), who estimate the e⁄ect of physically being
in school on juvenile crime in a particular day, and Hjalmarsson (2008), who estimates the
e⁄ects of arrest and incarceration on subsequent high school graduation.4 Using aggregate
(state-level) as well as individual-level data, Lochner and Moretti ￿nd that school attainment
signi￿cantly reduces the probability of arrest and incarceration. They ￿nd that this e⁄ect is
due to a reduction in criminal activity, rather than a direct e⁄ect on arrest and incarceration
probabilities conditional on committing a crime. Jacob and Lefgren combine daily measures
of criminal activity and school calendars in a number of local communities across the country,
and ￿nd that while the level of youth property crime is signi￿cantly lower on days when
school is in session than on days when it is not, the level of youth violent crime is higher.
Using data from the NLSY97, Hjamlarsson ￿nds that arrest and incarceration prior to age
4Other notable contributions include Lochner (2004), Tauchen et al. (1994), Williams and Sickels (2002)
and Witte and Tauchen (1994).
216 signi￿cantly reduce the probability of graduating high school by age 19, although the
e⁄ect of incarceration is relatively more robust than that of arrest.5
A second literature focuses on the relationship between working while attending school
and delinquency. This issue has been studied primarily by psychologists and criminologists
using a variety of data sets from several local and national studies of delinquency prevention.
For example, using data from a longitudinal study of two birth cohorts born in Racine, Wis-
consin, in 1942 and 1949, Shannon (1982) ￿nds that employment while in school is weakly
negatively related to future delinquency. Gottfredson (1985), using data from a national
evaluation study that followed samples of youths attending schools located in depressed,
predominantly minority, inner-city areas over a period of two years (1981-82), ￿nds that
working while in school does not increase delinquency in the following year. On the con-
trary, using data from the National Youth Survey, Ploeger (1997) ￿nds a positive correlation
between youth employment and some forms of delinquency.
The third issue concerns the persistence of youth criminal behavior or recidivism. The
literature on this topic is vast, especially in criminology.6 In a series of articles that are
most directly relevant, Nagin and Paternoster (1991), Nagin and Land (1993), Nagin et al.
(1995), and Broidy et al. (2003) identify di⁄erent patterns of criminal behavior over time
in several individual-level, longitudinal datasets. They relate these patterns to the presence
of unobserved ￿o⁄ender types￿among individuals, and assess the relative contributions of
unobserved types and state dependence (prior criminal behavior) to explain the data. They
￿nd that engaging in criminal activity at an early age increases the propensity to do so in
the future. Moreover, individuals di⁄er in their underlying propensity to engage in criminal
activity, and this unobserved trait is persistent over time. They ￿nd that the distribution of
this unobserved trait is summarized well by a small number of discrete types.7
5There is another strand of the literature that focuses on wage e⁄ects, either the relationship between
youth crime and wages, e.g., Freeman (1996), Grogger (1998) and Gould et al. (2002), or on the relationship
between arrest and incarceration and wages, see, e.g., Grogger (1995), Kling (2006) and Waldfogel (1994).
We do not review them here because the empirical approach we adopt does not address this issue.
6See, e.g., Blumstein et al. (1986), Godttfreddson and Hirschi (1990), and Wilson and Herrnstein (1985).
7The importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity has also been emphasized in the other two
literatures mentioned above (see, e.g., Lochner and Moretti (2004)).
3In this paper, we propose an approach to the empirical study of the relationships among
schooling, youth employment and youth crime that encompasses the three literatures. Rather
than investigating each relationship in isolation, our approach provides a comprehensive
analysis of the dynamic interactions among the di⁄erent choices youths make and their
possible exposure to the criminal justice system. The uni￿ed empirical framework we consider
takes the form of a multinomial discrete choice vector autoregression (VAR). In particular,
we specify a dynamic system of equations for an individual￿ s current schooling, work and
crime decisions as well as arrest and incarceration outcomes as a function of past decisions
and outcomes and unobserved types. We also allow for observable initial conditions, the
possibility of measurement error in all the variables, missing data, and correlation among
the contemporaneous shocks in all the equations.
In order to motivate the empirical speci￿cation and interpret the results, we outline a gen-
eral dynamic optimization model of youth behavior. The model embeds multiple mechanisms
through which unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence (past choices and outcomes)
may operate. The model makes clear how the discrete choice VAR can be considered as
an approximation to the decision rules of the model and how its parameters are related
to the fundamental structure of the behavioral model. Understanding this mapping from
the VAR parameters to the structure is critical to a correct interpretation of counterfactual
experiments using the VAR estimates.
We estimate the VAR using data from the NLSY97 on black male youths from age 14 to
the time they either graduate from high school or reach age 22 without having completed
high school. We assess the within-sample ￿t of the statistical model as well as its out-of-
sample performance in predicting the criminal behavior and the arrest and incarceration
rates of high school graduates between the ages of 19 and 22. We then use the estimates to
quantify the e⁄ect of initial conditions (unobserved heterogeneity and criminal activity at
age 13) and the persistence of past decisions (state dependence) on early adult outcomes. To
assess the importance of persistence, we simulate di⁄erent hypothetical scenarios for the same
individual and compare their outcomes. For example, for given initial conditions, we evaluate
the consequences for outcomes at ages 19 to 22 of arresting or incarcerating an individual
at age 14 who would have otherwise not being arrested or incarcerated. Borrowing from the
4terminology of the macro VAR literature, this procedure is similar to calculating ￿impulse
response functions￿to unanticipated, temporary outcome shocks. In a similar manner, we
also assess the impact of not attending school at age 16 and of working while attending
school on early adult behaviors and outcomes.
The VAR estimates indicate important roles for heterogeneity in initial conditions and
for state dependence. Among the categories of the initial conditions, we ￿nd that high
school graduation rates range from as low as 15 percent to as high as 85 percent, crime
rates at ages 19 to 22 range from 12 to 35 percent and incarceration rates from essentially
zero to 26 percent. We ￿nd that committing a crime at age 14 due to a transitory, i.e.,
once and not for all, shock increases the propensity to commit a crime at ages 19-22 by
between 7 and 11 percentage points depending on the youth￿ s initial conditions. This e⁄ect,
while considerable, is much smaller than the di⁄erence in crime rates, 18.7 percent, shown
in table 1. Similarly, the e⁄ect of not attending school on the likelihood of incarceration,
averaged over the estimated distribution of initial conditions, is 3.2 percentage points, while
the di⁄erence in table 1 is 12.4 percentage points. Although the simple comparisons of means
in table 1 greatly overstate the relationship between juvenile (age 14) and young adult (ages
19-22) criminal activity and between school attendance at age 16 and later incarceration, we
￿nd in other cases that the di⁄erence is small or even reversed. The e⁄ect of not attending
school at age 16 on the crime rate and on high school graduation are larger as estimated
from the VAR than in the raw comparison.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present an illustrative
dynamic model of youth crime, youth employment and high school completion which we use
in Section III to discuss brie￿ y the relative advantages and limitations of di⁄erent approaches
to the empirical study of youth crime. In Section IV, we describe the VAR speci￿cation,
in Section V the data and in Section VI the empirical implementation. Our results are
contained in Section VII. We conclude with Section VIII.
II. An Illustrative Dynamic Model of Youth Crime, Work and High School
Completion
Consider a youth who is currently age 14. At each age a ￿ 14, the youth poten-
tially chooses among eight mutually exclusive discrete alternatives comprised of all com-
5binations of attending school, sa = f0;1g, working in the labor market, ha = f0;1g, and
committing crime, ca = f0;1g.8 At any age, the youth has a history of previous choices
H1
a = (Hs
a;Hh
a;Hc
a), where Hj
a = (j14;j15;:::;ja￿1) for j = s;h;c: The set of alternatives
available to the youth is restricted by whether the youth is incarcerated at age a, in which
case the youth can make no choice in that period. We denote arrest at age a by Aa = f0;1g
and incarceration at age a by Ja = f0;1g. As with the youth￿ s choices, the youth has a
history of criminal justice outcomes given by H2
a = (HA
a ;HJ
a), where Hj
a = (j14;j15;:::;ja￿1)
for j = A;J.
Preferences:
The youth has a per-period utility function that depends on consumption, Xa, on the
previously speci￿ed choices, sa;ha;ca, on the youth￿ s current incarceration status, Ja, possi-
bly on the histories of choices, H1
a, as well as the history of the youth￿ s involvement with the
criminal justice system, H2
a, on the youth￿ s age, a, on a set of choice-speci￿c immutable pref-
erence endowments as of age 14, ￿1
14 = (￿s
14;￿h
14;￿c
14), and on a set of choice-speci￿c preference
shocks at age a, ￿a = (￿s
a;￿h
a;￿c
a). The history of shocks is denoted by H3
a = (H￿s
a ;H￿h
a ;H￿c
a ),
where H￿j
a = (￿
j
14;￿
j
15;:::;￿
j
a￿1) for j = s;h;c. The joint distribution of ￿a is denoted by
F(￿ajH3
a), and as shown may depend on the history of shocks. To summarize, the utility
function is given by
Ua = U(Xa;sa;ha;ca;H
1
a;H
2
a;Ja;a;￿
1
14;￿a); (1)
where
￿a ￿ F￿(￿ajH
3
a): (2)
Budget Constraint:
For simplicity, the youth is assumed to consume his income each period, that is, the
youth neither saves nor borrows. The youth (who is not incarcerated) has three sources of
income: (i) from parents, wp
a; (ii) from working in the legitimate sector and earning a wage,
wh
a; and (iii) from working in the illegitimate sector and earning an implicit wage of wc
a.
The transfer received from parents and the wage earned in each sector depend on histories
8As in the empirical work, the model abstracts from the intensive margin of these decisions. In addition,
we do not di⁄erentiate between heterogeneous types of crimes.
6and the youth￿ s age. They also depend on immutable endowments that re￿ ect parental
characteristics (earnings potential and preferences) and on legitimate- and illegitimate-sector
skill endowments of the youth at age 14. These are denoted by ￿2
14 = (￿wp
14 ;￿wh
14 ;￿wc
14): In
addition, parental contributions and wages are subject to shocks, denoted by ￿a = (￿p
a;￿h
a;￿c
a).
The history of shocks is denoted by H4
a = (H￿p
a ;H￿h
a ;H￿c
a ), where H￿j
a = (￿
j
14;￿
j
15;:::;￿
j
a￿1)
for j = p;h;c. The joint distribution of ￿a, which may be conditional on the history of
shocks, is denoted by F(￿ajH4
a). The budget constraint is thus
Xa = w
p
a + w
h
aha + w
c
aca; (3)
where
w
p
a = w
p(H
1
a;H
2
a;H
3
a;H
4
a;a;￿
p
a;￿
1
14;￿
2
14); (4)
w
h
a = w
h(H
1
a;H
2
a;a;￿
h
a;￿
wh
14 ); (5)
w
c
a = w
h(H
1
a;H
2
a;a;￿
c
a;￿
wc
14); (6)
￿a ￿ F￿(￿ajH
4
a): (7)
The parental contribution to the youth￿ s consumption, a decision of the parents, is as-
sumed to depend on the youth￿ s histories of prior choices, criminal justice involvement, pref-
erence shocks and shocks to prior income by source, and on the youth￿ s skill endowments.
The parental transfer function does not depend on contemporaneous shocks speci￿c to the
youth (￿a;￿h
a;￿c
a). Thus, the parents base their transfer on everything that is known up to the
current realizations of youth-speci￿c shocks; this allows the parent to use a forecast of future
behaviors and potential earnings in deciding on how much youth consumption to provide.
The parents are, in this sense, modeled as a Stackleberg leader, although the actual decision
process is not explicitly considered. The wages in the legitimate and illegitimate sectors
depend on the histories of choices and criminal justice involvement and on the sector-speci￿c
shocks and endowments. Thus, schooling may a⁄ect productivity in both sectors as might
work experience in each sector. Skill shocks and endowments are, however, sector-speci￿c.
A youth who is incarcerated at age a, as noted above, makes no choices. The youth￿ s
consumption is ￿xed at an amount XJ during that period.
Criminal Justice System Constraints:
7A youth faces a probability of arrest and a probability of incarceration given by
￿A(AajH
1
a;H
2
a;a;￿
wc
14;L); (8)
￿J(JajH
1
a;H
2
a;a;￿
wc
14;L): (9)
The probability that a youth is arrested at age a depends on the youth￿ s histories (of criminal
activity, schooling, employment and involvement with the criminal justice system), on the
youth￿ s age and endowment of illegitimate-sector skill, and on the youth￿ s location (assumed
￿xed over time), L; re￿ ecting area-speci￿c policing and judicial policies and resources. The
probability of being incarcerated is also conditioned on the same histories of the youth, age,
the illegitimate-sector skill endowment and location.
Horizon:
To restrict attention to youth crime and high school completion, the decision model is
speci￿ed only up to the last age an individual is permitted to attend high school, a, or the
age at which high school is completed, whichever comes ￿rst. If the individual has passed the
high school terminal age (a = a+1) without having graduated, the subsequent choice set is
restricted to (ha;ca) from that age on. Subsequent choices, for example, college attendance,
are not explicitly modeled for individuals that graduate before having passed the terminal
age. The last decision period that is modeled arises either when a youth has accumulated
11 years of schooling, is age a ￿ 1 or less, and decides at a to attend school, or when an
individual reaches age a with 11 years of schooling or less (regardless of the decision at a).
Objective Function:
The youth is assumed to maximize the present discounted value of lifetime utility. Be-
cause the model is truncated at either a or when the youth has completed high school, to com-
plete the speci￿cation of the model, it is necessary to specify terminal value functions. These
terminal value functions represent the expected discounted value of remaining lifetime utility
when either of these conditions arises. Speci￿cally, the terminal value function if the indi-
vidual graduates at age a might be modeled as, for example, V G(H1
a;H2
a;H3
a;H4
a;a;￿1
14;￿2
14).
The terminal function if the individual reaches age a + 1 without having graduated, also a
function of histories and endowments, V D(H1
a;H2
a;H3
a;H4
a;￿1
14;￿2
14), is the solution to the
same decision problem as prior to a + 1; absent the choice of attending school.
8Decision Rules:
The maximization problem can be cast as a dynamic programming problem and solved by
backwards recursion (see Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) for a similarly structured optimization
problem). The solution of the model yields a set of decision rules for the choice among
the eight mutually exclusive alternatives (for a non-incarcerated youth) that determine the
outcomes at each age. Letting dk
a = f0;1g for the k = 1;::;8 alternatives and a = 14;:::;a,
the solution may be written as
d
k
a =
8
<
:
1 if Gk(H1
a;H2
a;H3
a;H4
a;a;￿1
14;￿2
14;L;￿a;￿a) = 0
0 otherwise,
(10)
where the Gk functions are di⁄erences in the value function for alternative k and the max-
imum of the value functions over all of the 8 alternatives (see Keane and Wolpin (2001)).
Notice that when alternative k is chosen, Gk = 0 and Gk0 < 0 for all k0 6= k: Together with
the parental transfer function and the wage functions (4), (5) and (6), and the arrest and
incarceration probability functions (8) and (9), these 13 functions de￿ne all of the outcomes
of the model.
III. Empirical Approaches
The estimation problem arises because the researcher does not observe the shocks or the
endowments. There are several possible approaches to the empirical implementation of the
kind of dynamic model presented above.
Structural Approach:
The structural approach proceeds by specifying functional forms for the primitives of
the model: the utility function, the parental transfer and youth wage functions, the ar-
rest and incarceration probability functions, the terminal graduation value function and the
probability distributions for the preference, parental transfer and wage shocks and for the
endowments, F￿(￿1
14;￿2
14). Structural estimation of the model recovers the parameters of the
primitives (assuming that they are identi￿ed). Given the parameters of the primitives, the
parameters of the Gk functions, which are composites of the parameters of the primitives, are
also recovered. The advantage of the structural approach is that it enables the researcher to
perform a wide range of counterfactual policy experiments, including those that are outside
9of the sample experience.9
Semi-Structural Approach:
The semi-structural approach recovers a subset of the primitives. It does not necessarily
require that all of the functional forms and probability distributions be speci￿ed. An example
would be the estimation of the illegitimate sector wage function. Given exclusion restrictions,
that is, the existence of components of the histories that a⁄ect the decision to participate
in the illegitimate sector but that do not a⁄ect the returns in that sector, the illegitimate
sector wage function can be semi-parametrically estimated. Estimation of this kind would
be used to determine, for example, the e⁄ect of education on productivity in the illegitimate
sector.10
Non-Structural Approach:
The non-structural approach eschews the estimation of the primitive parameters. The goal
of the non-structural approach would be to estimate the parameters of the Gk functions. This
is the approach followed by the papers we reviewed in the introduction (which essentially
estimate di⁄erent Gk functions in isolation). It is also the approach we follow here. We
discuss in detail the methodology that we employ and what is learned from that approach
below.
IV. A Discrete Outcome VAR Approximation
Di⁄erent speci￿cations of the primitive functions will lead to di⁄erent Gk functions.
Rather than specify the primitive functions, we adopt a ￿rst-order approximation of the Gk
functions in the form of a multinomial discrete choice vector autoregression. To develop the
estimation procedure, suppose that the Gk functions are additively separable in histories
and contemporaneous shocks and that the shocks are mutually serially uncorrelated (so
that, conditional on the histories of observables and permanent unobserved heterogeneity,
the histories of shocks do not a⁄ect decisions), that is,
G
k = Gk(H
1
a;H
2
a;a;￿
1
14;￿
2
14) + u
k
a for k = 1;:::;8; 14 ￿ a ￿ a: (11)
9For example, Fella and Gallipoli (2006), Imai and Krishna (2004) and Sickles and Williams (2008) adopt
the structural approach.
10Examples of articles that follow the semi-structural approach are Grogger (1998) and Williams and
Sickles (2002).
10The uk
a￿ s are composites of all of the underlying contemporaneous shocks, ￿a and ￿a. As
noted, an equivalent representation of the decision rule is that the kth alternative is chosen
if and only if Gk > Gk0 for all k0 6= k: As in any multinomial discrete choice problem, one of
the Gk functions must be normalized to zero.
The representation given by (11) is obviously not parsimonious. An assumption of joint
normality of the uk
a￿ s would result in a 28-parameter variance-covariance matrix and adding
arrest and incarceration as outcomes would increase that total to 55 parameters. Making an
extreme value assumption would conserve on covariance parameters, but would still yield a
parameter space equal to the number of parameters in each Gk function times nine (including
the arrest and incarceration probability functions). To reduce the number of parameters in
the VAR representation that we estimate, we represent the decision rules by only three,
rather than seven, equations.11
The VAR in the three discrete choices thus takes the following form, where we account for
unobserved heterogeneity, inclusive of location-speci￿c factors (L), by assuming that there
are a ￿nite number of types, which we denote by ￿ = m for m = 1;:::;M:
sa =
8
<
:
1 if Qs
a ￿ 0
0 otherwise,
(12)
ha =
8
<
:
1 if Qh
a ￿ 0
0 otherwise,
(13)
ca =
8
<
:
1 if Qc
a ￿ 0
0 otherwise,
(14)
where, for j = s;h;c,
Q
j
a =
M X
m=1
￿
j
14;mI (￿ = m)+￿
j
1sa￿1 +￿
j
2ha￿1 +￿
j
3ca￿1 +￿
j
4Aa￿1 +￿
j
5Ja￿1 +gj(a)+u
j
a; (15)
11In a static discrete choice framework, a su¢ cient set of restrictions to yield this representation of the
decision rules is that the utility function U(sa;ha;ca;Aa;Ja) be additively separable in the choices. In a
dynamic setting, these restrictions are not su¢ cient and this representation is only an approximation to the
full set of decision rules.
11I (￿ = m) is an indicator variable equal to one if the youth is type m and zero otherwise and
gj(a) is a ￿ exible function of age.
We also incorporate arrest and incarceration probability functions, which, given the be-
havioral model, are taken to represent approximations to the structural arrest and incarcer-
ation probability functions:
Aa =
8
<
:
1 if QA
a ￿ 0
0 otherwise,
(16)
Ja =
8
<
:
1 if QJ
a ￿ 0
0 otherwise,
(17)
where QA
a and QJ
a are analogous to the Qj
a￿ s de￿ned in (15). The ￿ve shocks, (us
a;uh
a;uc
a;uA
a;uJ
a)
= ua, are assumed to be jointly serially uncorrelated, and contemporaneously joint normal
with variance-covariance matrix ￿. Each type of youth (m) is de￿ned by a 5-vector endow-
ment at age 14,
￿
￿s
14;m;￿h
14;m;￿c
14;m;￿A
14;m;￿J
14;m
￿
. The mth type comprises ￿m percent of the
population (￿M
m=1￿m = 1):
V. Data
The data are from the NLSY97. The NLSY97 consists of approximately 9000 youths age
12 to 16, as of December 31, 1996, who were ￿rst interviewed in 1997 and re-interviewed
annually since then. We make use of the ￿rst eight rounds of the survey. The NLSY97
contains an event history of schooling and employment, as well as detailed information in
each survey round about the extent of criminal activity and exposure to the criminal justice
system since the previous interview. While the crime related data are extensive, it is not
possible to create an event history, that is, to date each crime that a youth committed or to
determine whether the youth was apprehended and/or incarcerated for a speci￿c time-dated
crime (or set of crimes).
The time period for each annual observation runs from October 1 to September 30. A
youth￿ s age (in years) is the age as of October 1 of a given year. The dichotomous variables,
attending school at age a, sa, and being employed at age a, ha, are obtained from the event
history data. The schooling data were hand-edited in order to obtain a consistent pro￿le of
attendance and grade completion using information on attendance as of October 1, January
1 and April 1 of each school year, grade attending as of October 1, highest grade completed
12as of each interview date and the year of high school graduation (excluding GED￿ s). A youth
was considered attending school during the (school) year if we determined that the youth had
completed a year of schooling during that year and not attending otherwise. Weekly hours
worked, taken from the event history data, were summed over the weeks between October 1
of a given year and September 30 of the following year to obtain the youth￿ s annual hours
worked. A youth was considered to be working during the year if their hours worked were
at least 780 over the year.12
As noted, the crime data is not collected as an event history. Instead, at each interview,
the youth is asked about the number of times, if at all, since the last interview that the
youth engaged in a series of di⁄erent criminal activities: stealing something worth less than
50 dollars, stealing something worth 50 dollars or more, other property crimes (e.g., fencing
stolen property), selling drugs and assaults. The number of crimes of each type that a youth
committed since the date of the last interview was divided by the number of months since
the date of the last interview and the resulting ￿gure was distributed uniformly over the
months. Summing over the period between October 1 and September 30 gave the number
of crimes of each type that the youth committed over the period. The dichotomous variable
of whether or not the youth committed a crime at age a, ca, was determined by whether the
preceding sum was positive for any crime.13
The arrest data were obtained at each survey round as dated events by month and
year.14 At each survey round, the dates were collected for up to nine separate arrests since
12This de￿nition of employment essentially excludes youths who are employed only during the Summer
from being categorized as working.
13By itself, this procedure would potentially lead to an overstatement of the number of periods in which
crimes were committed and also introduce spurious correlation over time in the commission of crimes. To
avoid this problem, we hand-edited the data in cases where that issue was likely to arise. In de￿ning the
dichotomous crime variable, we did not include among the types of crimes having damaged property, which
seemed to us generally less signi￿cant. About 10 percent of youths in the 1997 survey round who had
reported having committed no other crime, reported having engaged in acts of vandalism.
14As discussed in Lochner (2007), the arrest data in the NLSY97 are generally consistent with o¢ cial
statistics.
13the date of the last interview.15 Beginning and ending dates (month and year) of each
period of incarceration were collected as well. The dichotomous arrest variable, Aa; was
de￿ned according to whether the youth of age a had been arrested between October 1 and
September 30. Similarly, the dichotomous variable Ja was determined by whether a youth
of age a was incarcerated at any time over the October 1-September 30 period.16
As might be expected, there is a signi￿cant amount of missing data. Missing data is
particularly serious in the statistical speci￿cation we have adopted. A missing value for
any of the variables requires that potentially up to two observations be dropped (at ages
a and a ￿ 1). In particular, we would lose about 20 percent of the observations for each
of the dependent variables in the VAR.17 Further, both because of the sensitive nature of
the data as well as the way we processed the data, it is not unreasonable to assume that
the dichotomous variables are subject to classi￿cation error. Our estimation procedure deals
with both of these complications.
VI. Empirical Implementation
To accommodate missing data and measurement error, the 5-equation discrete outcome
VAR is estimated using a procedure developed in Keane and Wolpin (2001) and extended
in Keane and Sauer (2005).18 The initial conditions are the youth￿ s type and whether or
not the youth committed a crime at age 13, c13: The other initial (i.e., age 13) conditions
are assumed not to vary; in particular, it is assumed that s13 = 1, h13 = 0, A13 = 0 and
15Reported arrests were followed up with questions about whether the youth was charged and convicted
for speci￿c types of crime. It is not possible to match, however, those charges and convictions with crimes
committed at any prior time because the youth was not asked about the correspondence with previously
reported crimes.
16The persistence of incarceration would be overstated with this de￿nition, because a youth who had a
single spell of incarceration of less than 12 months that overlapped two October 1-September 30 12-month
periods would be considered incarcerated in both periods. We hand-edited the data in those cases so that
such a youth would only be incarcerated for one period.
17Missing observations also arise because, as noted, some youths are observed beginning at age 15 and
others at age 16.
18In a Monte Carlo exercise with panel data probit speci￿cations similar to the one we estimate, Keane
and Sauer ￿nd that the estimation procedure performs well.
14J13 = 0:19 The estimation method is based on the simulation of complete outcome histories
from age 14 to age a for a set of arti￿cial agents of each unobserved type m and value of c13.
A history of outcomes consists of the simulated values of the youth￿ s choices sa, ha and ca
and of the youth￿ s involvement in the criminal justice system, Aa and Ja.
For a given set of parameters (￿0s, ￿0s and ￿), simulated outcome histories, e Oa(m;c13) =
(sa(m;c13);ha(m;c13);ca(m;c13);Aa(m;c13);Ja(m;c13)), are obtained for each type m and
value of c13 by drawing a set of u14 values from the joint distribution, solving for e O14(m;c13)
using equations (12)-(17), drawing a set of values of u15, solving for e O15(m;c13) and so on
up to the age a, which we take to be 22. We do this for n = 1;::;N arti￿cial agents, thus
yielding the set of simulated histories e On(m;c13) = (e On
14(m;c13); e On
15(m;c13);:::; e On
22(m;c13)).
If we knew a youth￿ s type and value of c13, we could obtain a frequency simulator of any
observed outcome vector for a youth (to the lesser of age 22, the age the youth graduates
from high school or the age the youth attrites from the sample). Letting Oi be the observed
outcome vector for youth i, an unbiased estimator for Pr(Oi) is simply the fraction of the
N simulated histories that are consistent with Oi. Missing observations on any elements
of Oi would be treated as being consistent with any entry in the corresponding element of
e On(m;c13). Note that the simulated probabilities rely only on unconditional simulations,
that is, on the simulation of entire outcome histories. Thus, to calculate the probability of
any observed outcome vector, we do not need to observe lagged outcomes.
Of course, this procedure is impractical as any observed history would be unlikely to
be replicated in the simulated histories often enough to get a reasonably precise estimate
of Pr(Oi). Indeed, unless N were huge, most observed outcome histories would have a
simulated frequency of zero. The procedure we adopt solves that problem by assuming
that all observed outcomes are measured with error, that is, that the discrete outcomes are
subject to classi￿cation error. With classi￿cation error, as seems apt given the data, any
19In the data, about 4 percent of black youths age 13 report having been arrested (at that age) and 0.6
percent report being incarcerated. In contrast, 24 percent of black youths report having committed a crime
at age 13. Although we could have incorporated arrest at age 13 as an initial condition, it would have
complicated the estimation without, in our judgment, changing the results in any substantively meaningful
way.
15observed outcome history is consistent with each of the N simulated histories. If we denote
Pr(Oije On(m;c13)) as the probability that an observed outcome history is generated by the
nth simulated outcome history, then using N simulated histories, an unbiased simulator of
Pr(Oi) is
b PN(O
ijm;c13) =
1
N
N X
n=1
Pr(O
ije O
n(m;c13)): (18)
If classi￿cation errors are independent across separate outcomes and ages, Pr(Oije On(m;c13))
is the product of the classi￿cation error rates (over the separate outcomes and at each age)
that are needed to make Oi consistent with e On(m;c13). If the youth￿ s type (m) is not ob-
served and c13 is observed (without error), then the ith youth￿ s likelihood contribution is
￿m b PN(Oijm;c13)￿mjc13, where ￿mjc13 is the probability that a youth is type m given the
value of c13. Consistency requires that c13 be exogenous conditional on type, that is, that
the stochastic component of the process generating c13; say u13, be independent of ua for
a ￿ 14.20 If c13 is also assumed to be potentially misclassi￿ed, then it is necessary to account
for the classi￿cation error in the estimation (as we do below).
Following Keane and Wolpin (2001), we assume that the classi￿cation error is unbiased
(and independent across outcomes and ages). To illustrate, consider one of the outcomes
at an arbitrary age, say attending school, sa. Denote sT
a as the true value and sR
a as the
reported value. Further, let qijj = Pr(sR
a = ijsT
a = j), qT
i = Pr(sT
a = i) and qR
i = Pr(sR
a = i);
i;j 2 f0;1g. Then unbiasedness requires that q1j1qT
1 + q1j0qT
0 = qR
1 = qT
1 , which implies
that
q1j0
q0j1 =
qT
1
1￿qT
1 . Note that the right hand side of this expression is only a function of the
true probability that sa = 1. Given this expression, to satisfy the unbiasedness assumption,
it is necessary that the classi￿cation error probabilities be linear in the true probability,
namely that q1j1 = ￿s + (1 ￿ ￿s)qT
1 , where ￿s, the classi￿cation error parameter, is estimable
(0 ￿ ￿s ￿ 1).21 Notice that as the probability that sa = 1 approaches one, the classi￿cation
error rate approaches zero (q1j1 ! 1).
If c13 is measured with error, which is the assumption we adopt, then we need to weight
20If they were not independent, an alternative method would be required to correctly account for the
stochastic initial condition, e.g., Heckman (1981).
21Identi￿cation of the classi￿cation error rates and VAR parameters is dependent on the normality as-
sumption for ua (see Hausman et. al., 1998).
16b PN(Oijm;c13) for each type and value of c13 by Pr(￿ = m;cT
13 = ijcR
13) = ￿mjcT
13 Pr(cT
13 = ijcR
13).
Using Bayes￿rule, Pr(cT
13 = ijcR
13) = Pr(cR
13jcT
13 = i)
Pr(cT
13=i)
Pr(cR
13) . The ￿rst term in this product is
given by the classi￿cation error and the second, given the unbiasedness assumption, is either
one if cR
13 = cT
13 = i or
Pr(cT
13=i)
Pr(cR
13=i0) if cR
13 6= i: If c13 is unobserved, then, for those observations, we
integrate it out using an estimate of Pr(cT
13 = i) from the proportion of youths with cR
13 = i
(which is equal to the proportion with cT
13 = 1 given unbiasedness).
VII. Results
Parameter Estimates:
The parameter estimates and standard errors for the VAR given by equations (12)-(17)
are reported in appendix table A.1.22 The estimation sample consists of 1,163 black males
accounting for 5,532 person-period observations. There are 757 youths observed beginning
at age 14, 239 beginning at age 15 and 167 beginning at age 16. Age e⁄ects are modeled
as a linear spline with knots at ages 18 and 21. The values of b PN(Oijm;cT
13) are based on
N = 10;800 simulated paths for each combination of m and cT
13.
We report the estimates for the model with three types (M = 3). However, we also
estimated the VAR for one, two and four types as well as for a speci￿cation in which the joint
distribution over the ￿ve ￿0s was normal.23 There is no appropriate formal statistical test on
which to base the choice of M: We therefore compared the ￿t of the alternative speci￿cations
using several measures. According to the BIC, M = 3 (74 parameters) was best, while
according to the AIC, M = 4 (81 parameters) was best. We also compared the out-of-
sample predictive accuracy of the di⁄erent speci￿cations based on the outcomes of youths at
ages 19-22 who graduated from high school. There was, however, no discernible di⁄erence
for M = 2;3 or 4, although the speci￿cation with M = 1 and with the normality assumption
were noticeably worse. Interestingly, the value of the BIC criterion was greatest for the
normal distribution (80 parameters), while the value of the AIC criterion was greatest for
M = 1 (60 parameters). Although as noted not all criteria favored M = 3; that speci￿cation
dominated the one with M = 2 based on both BIC and AIC, while the speci￿cation with
22There are 74 parameters. Parameters are generally precisely estimated.
23In the case of the normal distribution, the mean was allowed to di⁄er by whether or not the youth
committed a crime at age 13.
17M = 4 did not dominate either M = 3 or M = 2 on both. Details are provided in appendix
table A.2.24
The parameter estimates re￿ ect the underlying structure of the behavioral model, at
least as an approximation, but are not directly interpretable. The VAR parameters, the
￿0s; the ￿0s and those of the age splines, are composites of all of the structural parameters,
including parameters of the utility function, the parental transfer function, the legitimate
and illegitimate sector wage functions, the arrest and incarceration probability functions and
the variance-covariance structure of the shocks. The contemporaneous error correlations
(￿) re￿ ect, in the context of the behavioral model, correlations among composites of the
underlying preference, wage, and other shocks. However, given the 12-month time period
of the observations, it is likely that these correlations also re￿ ect other components of the
structure. For example, as seen in appendix table A.1, the correlation between the shocks
to the crime and arrest equations is .512, which likely captures, in part, the structural arrest
probability function (that is, that a youth that committed a crime at age a was arrested at
age a). Similarly, the contemporaneous correlation between the shocks to attending school
and being incarcerated, -.275, likely represents, in part, an incapacitation e⁄ect from being
incarcerated for at least a part of the year.
Descriptive Statistics and Fit:
In the estimation sample, youths are followed either until they graduate from high school
or until age 22, whichever comes ￿rst. Observations of youths from the age that they
graduate from high school until they reach age 22 are out-of-sample observations (not used
in estimation). Table 2 shows the outcome proportions in the estimation sample by age
and the corresponding ￿t of the VAR.25 As seen in table 2, school attendance rates decline
24The four independent values of the type probability function, ￿mjcT
13, m = 1;2;3, cT
13 = 0;1, are not
restricted in estimation. A multinomial logit speci￿cation is used to constrain the probabilities to lie between
zero and one.
25The predicted outcome paths are based on simulations of 10,800 youths for each of the six m and cT
13
combinations. Each category is weighted by Pr(m;cT
13) = Pr(mjcT
13)￿Pr(cT
13): The ￿rst term is ￿mjcT
13 and is
estimated along with the VAR parameters. The second term, given our assumption of unbiasedness in the
classi￿cation error, is the proportion of youths in the data reporting having committed a crime (or not) at
age 13. Those youths for whom age 13 crime is missing, primarily those who were ages 15 and 16 at the time
18from 94 percent at age 14 to 66 percent at age 17, re￿ ecting the large high school dropout
rate among black males. The 25 percentage point drop between ages 17 and 18 and the
further drop by 30 percentage points between ages 18 and 19 re￿ ect the sample restriction
to non-graduates in addition to dropouts.26 There are three ways in which these large one-
year declines are captured in the estimated VAR, through direct age e⁄ects, through lagged
dependencies (not attending school in a period reduces the probability of attending the next
period) that reinforce the age e⁄ect and through the compositional change in the types
that are represented among those who have not graduated from high school by those ages.
Although the ￿rst two together account for much of the decline, the compositional change
accounts also for a non-trivial part of the decline, 25 percent of the drop between ages 17
and 18 and for 31 percent of the drop between ages 18 and 19. Overall, as seen in the table,
deviations between the predicted and actual school attendance rates are small over the entire
age range.27
The crime rate is essentially constant over the 14 to 17 age range, when the sample is
relatively more homogeneous. On average, about 27 percent of black males commit at least
one crime at (each of) those ages. Although the crime rate drops at age 18 for the sample
of non-graduates, it jumps back up to previous levels at age 19 and (except for age 22)
remains there.28 Between ages 17 and 19, the compostional change accounts for 64 percent
of the (predicted) increase in crime. As the table shows, the actual and predicted overall
rates at ages 14 to 18 and 19 to 22 are generally close. Arrest rates increase slowly from
age 14 to age 17, starting from .098 and increasing to .129. There is a large jump at age
18, to .205, and a further jump at age 19, to .233. As seen, the VAR estimates overstate
of the ￿rst survey, are assumed to have the same distribution of age 13 crime as those reporting on c13.
26Of those who graduate from high school, 65 percent graduate by age 18 and 95 percent by age 19.
27In addition to predicting well the outcome proportions, the VAR also predicts high school graduation
rates (cuumulative secondary school attendance) well. The actual and predicted high school graduation rates
are 60.5 vs. 62.1 percent.
28The drop at age 22 may re￿ ect sample variation given that there are only 53 observations of non-high
school graduates at age 22. There is a slight downward trend in the crime rate for the group that will never
graduate from high school; the crime rate is 36 percent at age 14 and 29 percent at age 21.
19the rise in arrest rates to age 17 and understate the jump at age 18, although the level at
age 18 is almost identical in the actual data and the model prediction. The compositional
change between ages 17 and 18 accounts for 57 percent of the (predicted) jump in the arrest
rate and for more than 100 percent of the increase between ages 18 and 19. Incarceration
rates also increase with age, with large jumps at ages 18 and 19. The compositional change
accounts for 45 percent of the increased incarceration rate between ages 17 and 18 and for
65 percent between the ages of 18 and 19. The trend in the incarceration rate is ￿t well; the
actual and predicted incarceration rates at ages 14 to 18 are .038 and .035 and at ages 19
to 22, .130 and .121.29 Similarly, the rise in employment to age 17 is captured well, but the
employment rate between ages 19 and 22 is overstated, .463 vs. .417. None of the increase
in employment rates between the ages of 17 and 19 is due to compositional changes in the
sample.
Table 3 assesses the ability of the VAR to ￿t the crime-related data for the out-of-sample
observations of high school graduates at ages 19 to 22.30 The ￿rst column shows the actual
outcome proportions for the out-of-sample observations. Comparing tables 2 and 3, crime
rates are about half of the level for high school graduates at those ages than for non-high
school graduates (.154 vs. .284), arrest rates less than one-third as large (.072 vs. .253)
and incarceration rates about one-sixth as large (.019 vs. .130). Clearly, those youths who
29Outcome proportions over age groups, 14 to 18 and 19 to 22, are the total number of occurrences over
the ages in the range divided by the number of observations over those ages. They are thus the weighted
averages of the outcome proportions at each age, where the weights are the proportions of observations at
each age. Although the number of observations at ages 14 to 18 are fairly similar, within the 19 to 22 age
range, ignoring outcome-speci￿c missing values, 45 percent of the observations are at age 19, 30 percent at
age 20, 18 percent at age 21 and only 6 percent at age 22.
30Given our focus on crime and on high school completion, we do not report the out-of-sample ￿t at ages
19 to 22 to college attendance or employment. Indeed, we did not extract the college attendance data from
the NLSY97, which, given the ages spanned by the cohort, is still incomplete for many observations. By
construction, the VAR representation cannot predict the large fraction of youths with exactly 12 years of
schooling, and thus will necessarily overstate the fraction of youths who enter college. It appears that this
overstatement of college entry causes the model to understate the fraction of high school graduates at those
ages who work. The estimated VAR predicts an employment rate of .55 when the actual rate is .63.
20graduated from high school, and who are then dropped from the sample, have di⁄erent
outcomes at ages 19-22 than those non-graduates maintained in the sample.
The VAR accounts for those di⁄erences because of di⁄erences in initial conditions, unob-
served types and crime at age 13, di⁄erences that tend to be magni￿ed by the autoregressive
structure.31 Youths who graduate from high school have di⁄erent initial conditions that lead
them to attend school and commit fewer crimes at all ages. Path dependencies in those
outcomes further augment these di⁄erences between graduates and non-graduates. Allowing
for unobserved heterogeneity is essential for the out-of-sample predictive accuracy of the
VAR speci￿cation. As the initial sample ages, the composition of the estimation sample
changes dramatically in terms of the type distribution. For example, the proportion of type
3 youths is estimated to be 52 percent at age 17, drops to 40 percent at age 18 (re￿ ecting
the elimination of those who graduated from high school by age 18) and to 25 percent at age
19 (re￿ ecting the elimination of those who graduated by age 19).32
Given the large di⁄erences between the estimation sample and out-of-sample outcome
proportions, the out-of-sample predictions of crime rates, arrest rates and incarceration rates
at ages 19 to 22, as seen in columns 1 and 2 of table 3, are remarkably good. The predicted
crime rate for the out-of-sample observations is only .007 percentage points lower than the
actual crime rate, the predicted arrest rate .002 lower than the actual and the predicted
incarceration rate .001 lower than the actual. This is in sharp contrast to a model in which
there is no unobserved heterogeneity (M = 1). In that model, although the di⁄erence is
about the same for crime rates, the di⁄erence for arrest and incarceration rates are .060
and .025.33 The last two columns of table 3, combining both the non-high school graduate
and high school graduate samples, indicate a close correspondence between the actual and
predicted outcomes for crime, arrest and incarceration rates for that combined sample.
31Although the linear age spline has knots at ages 18 and 21, and therefore contributes to the ￿t at
ages 19-22 in a somewhat ￿ exible way, the age trend is restricted to be the same for both the within- and
out-of-sample observations.
32As we will see below, the type 3￿ s are the most likley to attend school, and thus graduate, and the least
likely to engage in crime.
33These di⁄erences are .049 and .028 for the joint normality speci￿cation.
21The extent to which the outcome variables su⁄er from classi￿cation error is estimated to
be small. The classi￿cation error rate, as given by the joint probability of observing a one
when the true outcome is a zero plus the joint probability of observing a zero when the true
outcome is a one is lowest for incarceration, .004, followed by school attendance, .040, crime,
.044, arrest, 063, and work, .111.
The E⁄ect of Initial Conditions on Early Adult Outcomes:
The importance of the two initial conditions, the unobserved type of a youth and whether
a youth committed a crime at age 13, in accounting for early adult (age 19-22) outcomes is
shown in table 4. The three types appear distinct. Type 3￿ s have the highest high school
graduation rate, 85.2 percent for those youths who did not commit a crime at age 13 and
80.1 percent for those that did. These rates exceed those of type 2￿ s by 41 percentage points
for youths with c13 = 0 and by almost 50 percentage points for those with c13 = 1: The
lowest graduation rates are those for type 1￿ s; only one in four youths who did not commit a
crime at age 13 graduate from high school and less than one in six of those who did commit
a crime graduate. Crime rates, however, are not ordered in the same way. Type 2￿ s are the
most crime prone, followed by type 1￿ s and then type 3￿ s. Speci￿cally, at its highest, the
age 19-22 crime rate for type 2 youths who committed a crime at age 13 is .354, while the
crime rate is only .122 for type 3 youths who did not commit a crime at age 13. Arrest rates,
however are highest for type 1￿ s even though they have, as noted, a lower crime rate than
type 2 youths, exceeding those of type 2￿ s by about 5 percentage points.34 Arrest rates are
quite low for type 3￿ s, both absolutely and relative to their crime rates. Incarceration rates,
like arrest rates, are highest for type 1￿ s and lowest for type 3￿ s. Over one-quarter of type 1￿ s
who committed a crime at age 13 are incarcerated at ages 19-22. The same incarceration rate
is 12.7 percent for type 2￿ s and 0.2 percent for type 3￿ s. As the table shows, both unobserved
34As seen, the number of periods in which type 1￿ s are arrested exceeds the number of periods in which
they committed a crime. One reason for the excess of arrests over crimes is because we treat a youth who has
committed multiple crimes in a period as the same as a youth who committed only one crime. The former
youth may be arrested in more than one future period for those multiple crimes, which will make it look like
the youth was arrested more times than the number of times he committed a crime. Another reason is that
a youth may in fact be arrested for a crime that he did not commit.
22heterogeneity, a youth￿ s type, and state dependence, whether the youth committed a crime
at age 13, have signi￿cant impacts on young adult outcomes.
To obtain a measure of the relative importance of these initial conditions, table 5 shows
the e⁄ect of changing each of the initial conditions. The ￿rst counterfactual makes every
youth a type 3 and the second eliminates all crime at age 13. If all youths were type 3￿ s,
high school graduation rates would increase by 23.8 percentage points, crime rates between
the ages of 19 and 22 would drop by 6.0 percentage points, arrest rates by 11.4 percentage
points and incarceration rates by 6.4 percentage points (essentially eliminating all black
youth incarceration). The e⁄ects of eliminating crime at age 13 are generally more modest.
The increase in the high school graduation rates is 3.8 percentage points and the fall in the
crime, arrest and incarceration rates are 2.1, 1.9 and 1.2 percentage points.
The Correlates of Initial Conditions:
The experiment of changing a youth￿ s type or their criminal activity at age 13 is perhaps
interesting, but would have operational content only if it were known how to accomplish
those changes and at what cost. Table 6 shows how observable background characteristics
of the youth￿ s parents and the youth￿ s AFQT score are related to initial conditions.35 There
are two reasons to look at these observable characteristics. First, one can see the extent
to which observables account for the permanent characteristics captured by type and crime
at age 13. Second, to the extent that changing these characteristics would also change the
youth￿ s initial conditions, that is, to the extent that these correlations do not re￿ ect either
intergenerationally transmitted immutable characteristics or other factors related to these
characteristics, one can identify factors that it might prove useful to target in order to reduce
youth crime and increase high school completion rates. Table 6 shows the fraction of each
type and c13 initial-conditions combination by a number of characteristics, where we denote
these fractions by Pmc13, m = 1;2;3 and c13 = 0;1.
As seen in table 6, the proportion of youths who are type 3￿ s is monotonically increasing
(with one exception) in mother￿ s schooling, regardless of whether or not they commit a crime
at age 13, and the proportion who are type 1￿ s or 2￿ s monotonically decreasing. For example,
35Type probabilities can be assigned to each sample observation (i) by an application of Bayes￿ rule:
Pr(m;c13jdatai) =
L(dataijm;c13)Pr(m;c13)
￿m￿c13L(dataijm;c13)Pr(m;c13); where L denotes the likelihood.
23the proportion of youth who are type 3 (summing over c13) is .432 if the youth￿ s mother is
a high school dropout and .690 if the youth￿ s mother is a college graduate. Although these
di⁄erences by mother￿ s schooling are not substantively small (and are statistically signi￿-
cant), mother￿ s schooling does not explain a large part of the variance in initial conditions.
For example, the R2 from a regression of P30 on the entire set of individual schooling level
dummies of mother￿ s schooling is only .041. And, while the mother schooling dummies are
statistically signi￿cant, the R2￿ s from the same regression on the rest of the type and c13
combinations range from only .012 (for P21) to .056 (for P10).36
To quantify the size of the e⁄ect, consider the extreme scenario of making all mothers
college graduates and assume that such a change would lead to the initial conditions dis-
tribution of that group shown in the table. Combined with the ￿gures in table 4, one can
compute the e⁄ect of that change on age 19 to 22 outcomes. In particular, the crime rate
would be predicted to fall from .206 to .176 and the incarceration rate from .064 to .043.
Although these changes are not insubstantial (though perhaps surprisingly small), achieving
them in this way is outside the realm of feasibility.
Table 6 also shows that not having been born to a teen mother increases the probability
of being a type 3 youth (for both values of c13) and reduces the probability of the other initial
conditions categories. Having lived with both biological parents also increases the probability
of being a type 3 youth, but only for c13 = 0, and reduces the probability of being of type 1
and 2 (for both values of c13). However, the di⁄erences in the initial conditions distributions
for either background variable is fairly small as measured by their consequences for crime,
arrests and incarcerations. For example, if all youths were born to non-teen mothers, and
if that induced the initial conditions distribution associated with non-teen mothers, the
predicted incarceration rate would fall from .064 to .059.
The next two rows in table 6 contrast the initial conditions probabilities for two com-
binations of the three variables depicting worst and best case scenarios: (1) a youth whose
mother is a high school dropout, who was born to a teen mother and who did not always
live with both biological parents vs. (2) a youth whose mother is a college graduate, who
36Part of the variance in the iniital conditions proportions (Pmc13) is due to measurement error, that is
to the fact that these are sample estimates of the dichotomous true initial conditions.
24was not born to a teen mother and who always lived with both biological parents. These
are extremes in the sample, with only 4.8 percent of the sample falling into the worst case
and 5.2 percent into the best case. Even in the best case scenario, the proportion of type 3
youths who do not commit a crime at age 13 is still below 55 percent.
Finally, the table shows the relationship between the (black-speci￿c) quartiles of the
AFQT score and initial conditions probabilities.37 The di⁄erence between the lowest and
highest quartile is similar to that for mother￿ s schooling. Regression R2￿ s range from .025
to .079 over the initial conditions categories. Hence, even if we were able to move AFQT
scores of black youths so that all achieve the fourth quartile level of performance, say by
increasing school quality, and if we assume that by doing so we would also change the type
and c13 probability distribution to that quartile￿ s distribution, the proportion of type 3￿ s
would still be only about 70% of the population.38
How Persistent are "Transitory" Decisions on Early Adult Outcomes?
To understand the mechanism by which youth behaviors, such as attending school at age
16, working at age 16 while attending school and committing a crime at age 14, are related
to early adult outcomes, we perform three counterfactual experiments that are based on
individual-level "impulse response functions" derived (by simulation) from the VAR speci-
￿cation. The experiments demonstrate the extent to which these relationships stem from
transitory shocks that set a youth on a decision path that is more likely to be aberrant
as opposed to a youth￿ s permanent propensity to engage in aberrant behavior. In the ￿rst
experiment (table 7), we simulate the impact of a youth committing a crime at age 14 on his
likelihood of committing a crime and of being incarcerated at ages 19 to 22 (separately for
each of the three types). We compare those outcomes to the case where the youth did not
37The AFQT (Armed Forces Qualifying Test) score is a combination of several subtests of the ASVAB
(Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery) based on a formula similar to the AFQT score generated by
the DOD and found in the NLSY79. The AFQT score for the NLSY97 was created by the CHRR sta⁄ at
The Ohio State University.
38We also looked at whether the youth lived in an urban area at age 12 and the youth￿ s region of residence
at age 12. The percentage of type 3 youths residing in an urban area at age 12 was about 9 percentage
points lower than the percentage in a non-urban area. In addition, the largest proportion of type 3 youths
resided in the West.
25commit a crime at age 14, holding constant all combinations of whether or not the youth was
arrested, incarcerated, attended school or worked at age 14.39 We repeat this experiment by
simulating the impact of the youth, having committed a crime at age 14, also being arrested
at age 14 and then also being incarcerated.40 In the second and third experiments, we use
the same methodology to consider the impact on the likelihood of committing a crime and
of being incarcerated at ages 19 to 22 of a youth working at age 16 while attending school as
opposed to not working while attending school (table 8) and of a youth not attending school
at age 16 as opposed to attending at age 16 (table 9).41
In table 7, the ￿rst row (for each type) shows the di⁄erence in the likelihood of commit-
ting a crime and of being incarcerated at ages 19-22 for a youth who does not commit a crime
at age 14 and for a youth who, having committed a crime at age 14, is neither arrested or
incarcerated. As seen, the crime rate for a type 1 black youth would be 7.5 percentage points
higher at ages 19-22 for the youth had he committed a crime at age 14 (absent arrest and
incarceration) than for the youth had he not committed a crime at age 14. Correspondingly,
the probability that the youth would be incarcerated at ages 19-22 would be 9.6 percentage
points higher.42 The di⁄erence in the crime rate of a type 2 youth is slightly higher, 10.5
39All of the counterfactuals are based on simulating 86,400 outcome paths for each of the six initial
condition categories. Letting the outcome vector at age 14 be (c14;A14;J14;s14;h14), this counterfactual
compares the later outcomes for youths with (0;0;0;s14;h14) to youths with (1;0;0;s14;h14) integrating
over the four possible combinations of (s14;h14):
40These counterfactuals are based on comparisons of youths with the outcome vector at age 14 given
by (0;0;0;s14;h14) to youths with the vector (1;1;0;s14;h14) and (1;1;1;s14;h4), each taken over the four
possible combinations of (s14;h14):
41The counterfactual in table 8 compares youths with age 14 outcome vectors (c14;A14;J14;1;1) to
(c14;A14;J14;1;0) over all combinations of (c14;A14;J14). Similarly, the counterfactual in table 9 com-
pares youths with age 14 outcome vectors (c14;A14;J14;0;0) to (c14;A14;J14;1;0) over all combinations of
(c14;A14;J14).
42The increase in the incarceration rate may exceed the increase in the crime rate for several reasons.
First, an individual may be incarcerated for multiple years for a single crime. Second, we do not account for
the commission of multiple crimes in a given year. Thus, for example, an individual who commits two crimes
at age 19 may be arrested and incarcerated at age 19 for one crime and then arrested and incarcerated at
age 20 for the other crime.
26percentage points, while the di⁄erence in the incarceration rate is somewhat lower, 5.5 per-
centage points. Recall that type 1 and type 2 youths have the highest crime rates over the
three groups. However, the impact of having committed a crime at age 14 on the propensity
to engage in crime at ages 19-22 is signi￿cant even for the less crime-prone type (type 3).
Having committed a crime at age 14, a type 3 youth is 7.2 percentage points more likely to
commit a crime at ages 19-22, comparable to the more crime-prone type 1 youth. However,
the e⁄ect on the likelihood of incarceration is essentially zero for type 3.43
Next, consider the case of a youth who, having committed a crime at age 14, is arrested
but not incarcerated. As the second row (for each type) shows, arrest without incarceration
does not change the age 19-22 propensity to engage in crime relative to that of not being
arrested (see row 1) for a type 1 youth, but increases it by 1.2 percentage points for type
2 and by 1.6 percentage points for a type 3 youths. Suppose, however, that the youth in
addition to being arrested is also incarcerated. In that case, a type 1 youth would have an
increased propensity to commit a crime at ages 19-22 that is 7.8 percentage points higher
than a youth who did not commit a crime at age 14. This increase is only slightly greater
than the increase of 7.5 percentage points if the youth had been arrested but not incarcerated
or if the youth had not been arrested. The di⁄erence in the propensity given incarceation is
only slightly larger than that given arrest, 11.8 vs. 11.7 percentage points.
The result that the increase in crime at ages 19-22 is greater when, having committed
a crime at age 14, the youth is arrested without being incarcerated, and still greater when
arrested and incarcerated, should not be interpreted as re￿ ecting the lack of a deterrent
e⁄ect for black youths in the usual sense, that is, as a response to a change in the probability
of arrest or incarceration.44 What is true of a single youth who, having committed a crime
at age 14 (randomly) experiences an arrest or a spell of incarceration relative to one who
does not, would not necessarily be true if there was a general increase in the probability
43One possible explanation for the negligible e⁄ect on incarceration is that type 3 youths may commit less
serious crimes, which we do not account for in the estimation. Although not reported, as with the likelhood
of incarceration, the e⁄ect on the probability of arrest is very small for type 3. Thus, another possibility is
that youths of these types are more skilled criminals.
44The modern empirical literature on crime and deterrence began with Ehrlich (1973).
27of arrest or incarceration faced by all youths. This fallacy of composition arises because a
change in the probability of arrest or incarceration, as emphasized previously, would change
the parameters of the VAR, which depend on the entire set of structural parameters of the
behavioral model.
Arrest at age 14 also increases the likelihood of being incarcerated at ages 19 to 22 relative
to not being arrested, by 1.9 percentage points for a type 1 youth and by 1.7 percentage
points for a type 2 youth. This increase in the likelihood of incarceration perhaps re￿ ects an
increased capability by the police to identify someone as having committed a crime if he had
been arrested previously.45 As also seen in the table, for type 1 youths, incarceration at age
14 increases the likelihood of incarceration at ages 19-22 by 1.1 percentage points relative to
the case where the youth was arrested but not incarcerated (12.6 vs. 11.5 percentage points)
and by 0.6 percentage points for type 2 youths.46
Table 8 compares outcomes at ages 19-22 for a youth who works at age 16 while in school
as opposed to one who does not. As seen, a youth, having experienced a shock (or set of
shocks) that induces him to work while attending school at age 16, has a lower propensity
to commit a crime at ages 19 to 22 ranging from 3.7 percentage points for a type 3 youth to
6.4 percentage points for a type 2 youth. An age 16 type 1 youth who works while attending
school also has a 7.7 percentage point lower likelihood of being incarcerated at ages 19-22
relative to a youth who attends school without working. The e⁄ect is 4.1 percentage points
for a type 2 youth and essentially zero for a type 3.
The e⁄ect on crime and incarceration at ages 19 to 22 of not attending school at age 16
are shown in table 9. For all types, not attending school at age 16 increases the propensity
to commit a crime signi￿cantly, from a low of 7.2 percentage points for a type 1 youth to
a high of 14.8 percentage points for a type 3 youth. The likelihood of incarceration also
increases non-trivially for a type 1 youth, by 8.1 percentage points, and for a type 2 youth,
by 5.6 percentage points. As was true for the other experiments, there is no e⁄ect on the
45In addition, although, as noted, we do not account explicitly for the type of crime, possibly a youth who
is arrested at age 14 commits more serious crimes at later ages than a youth who is not arrested.
46Note that even with over 80,000 simulated paths, the number of times a type 3 youth was arrested and
incarcerated at age 14 was too small to obtain a reliable comparison.
28probability of incarceration for type 3 youths.
The Transition from School to Jail:
Table 1 showed that youths who do not attend school at age 16 have incarceration rates
that are 4 times greater at ages 19 to 22, crime rates that are two-thirds greater, arrests rates
that are 2.5 times greater and a high school graduation rate that is almost 70 percentage
points lower. Table 10 uses the same simulated data as for the counterfactual experiments
presented above to determine the extent to which controlling for classi￿cation error, for the
inter-related nature of youth decisions/outcomes and for unobserved heterogeneity a⁄ect
those comparisons. The ￿rst row of table 10 repeats the ￿rst row of table 1. The second
row shows the ￿t of the VAR to the data, that is, it takes the data simulated from the VAR,
adds classi￿cation error based on the estimates, and shows the same di⁄erences in means
by school attendance at age 16. As seen, the predictions are close in terms of the point
estimates and, with the exception of the high school graduation rate, fall well within the 95
percent con￿dence intervals of the di⁄erences in means in the actual data.47
The third row takes the simulated data with classi￿cation error, estimates linear proba-
bility models for each outcome at ages 19 to 22 on whether or not the youth was in school
at age 16 and on the other age 16 decisions/outcomes (whether or not the youth committed
a crime at age 16, was arrested at age 16, was incarcerated at age 16 and worked at age
16) and reports the coe¢ cient on the age 16 school attendance variable.48 The next row
reports the same regression coe¢ cient after adding dummy variables for the youth￿ s type.
As the table shows, accounting for the other decision/outcomes that arise along with the
school attendance decision at age 16 reduces the impact of not attending school at age 16 on
all of the young adult outcomes. Heterogeneity further reduces the impact of not attending
school, generally by a large amount and to a greater extent than including the other age 16
47Even with respect to the high school graduation rate, the predicted point estimate is only 5 percentage
points too high.
48We also estimated a ￿ve-equation restricted speci￿cation in which these decision/outcomes were not inter-
related through their histories. Each equation included types, the age spline and the own lagged variable.
The speci￿cation also allowed for contemporaneous error correlations. A likelihood ratio test rejected the
speci￿cation.
29outcomes. Overall, the di⁄erence in the likelihood of being incarcerated at ages 19-22 falls
from 11.5 percentage points (row 2, the prediction from the VAR estimates) to 8.4 percent-
age points when the other age 16 variables are included, and ￿nally to only 2.8 percentage
points when the type dummies are also included. Similarly, the di⁄erence in the probability
of committing a crime falls from 11.6 to 6.6 percentage points and in the probability of arrest
from 16.4 to 3.6 percentage points. The di⁄erence in the high school graduation rate is also
attenuated, by 20 percentage points.
The next three rows perform the same regressions accounting for the e⁄ect of classi￿cation
error, that is, by using the simulated data without adding on the classi￿cation error. As seen,
e⁄ects are larger when classi￿cation error is accounted for. In particular, the e⁄ect of school
attendance on the likelihood of incarceration controlling for both other age 16 outcomes and
for heterogeneity increases from 2.8 to 3.4 percentage points when classi￿cation error is taken
into account. Similarly, the e⁄ect on the probability of committing a crime increases from
6.6 to 9.7 percentage points, the e⁄ect on the likelihood of arrest increases from 3.6 to 6.2
and the e⁄ect on the probability of graduating from high school increases (in absolute value)
from 52.9 to 64.4 percentage points.
The last row in table 10 provides the "true" estimates. These estimates allow not only
for classi￿cation error, for other inter-related outcomes and for (additive) heterogeneity, but
also for the heterogeneous e⁄ects that arise from the VAR speci￿cation. They are obtained
directly from the counterfactuals performed in table 9 for crime and incarceration probabili-
ties and from the same counterfactuals (not reported) for arrest and high school graduation
probabilities. The e⁄ect of not attending school at age 16 on the outcomes are simply the
weighted averages of the e⁄ects for each of the three types, where the weights are the esti-
mated sample type proportions. As seen, these estimates imply that not attending school
at age 16 increases the likelihood of being incarcerated at ages 19 to 22 by 3.2 percentage
points on average, the probability of committing a crime by 12.9 percentage points and of an
arrest by 6.1 percentage points. Not attending school at age 16 also reduces the probability
of graduating from high school by 75.4 percentage points on average. Thus, the degree to
which the simple comparison of outcomes for those youths that do or do not attend school
at age 16 would be misleading varies across outcomes; the di⁄erence between the simple
30comparison and the "true" estimate is large for incarceration (3.2 vs. 11.5) and for arrest
(6.1 vs. 16.4), but small for crime (12.9 vs.11.6) and for high school graduation (75.4 vs.
73.1).
VIII. Conclusions
Using data on black male youths from the NLSY97 we have estimated a ￿ve-variate
discrete-outcome vector autoregression. The ￿ve variables, school attendance, employment,
criminal activity, arrest and incarceration, were viewed as representing inter-related youth
decisions/outcomes. The VAR approach is especially well suited to provide a quantitative
assessment of the impact of stochastic occurrences during one￿ s youth on later outcomes and
to distinguish those impacts from permanent behavioral di⁄erences among youths. What,
for example, are the consequence for young adult outcomes of not dropping out of school at
age 16 because, for example, a youth happens to have an inspiring teacher that year? Or,
what are the consequences of stealing something at age 14 because a random opportunity
arose in which the likelihood of being caught appeared to be very low? What happens if that
youth is nevertheless apprehended, and what if the youth is incarcerated as well? Or, what
are the consequences if a 16 year old youth happens to come upon an appealing after-school
job?
In estimating the e⁄ects of stochastically generated path dependencies, we accounted for
permanent unobserved heterogeneity in the youths￿traits and environment and for measure-
ment error in the data. The estimation revealed that there were three distinct types in the
NLSY97 sample of black male youths. One type has a high school graduation rate of around
20 percent, another around 40 percent and the third around 85 percent. The two lower
graduation types engage in crime and are arrested more often when young adults. Among
those two types, the lowest graduation type is incarcerated at over twice the rate.
We found that stochastic occurrences can also be important in determining outcomes
as young adults and can vary considerably by permanent underlying propensities. To take
one example, for the two lower graduation types, comprising 47 percent of black youths, the
impact of not attending school at age 16, which is tantamount to never completing high
school, is to increase the probability of being incarcerated as a young adult (ages 19-22) by
8.1 and 5.6 percentage points. These represent increases in the probability of incarceration
31for these two types of 39 percent and 58 percent. On the other hand, not attending school at
age 16 does not a⁄ect the incarceration probability for the high graduation type, although
the probability of committing a crime at ages 19-22 increases markedly. Either youths of
this type, who ordinarily have a high school graduation rate around 85 percent, are "smart"
criminals or commit crimes that are unlikely to be punished by incarceration (or both).
There is a growing literature that appears to indicate that the behavior of young adults is
to a large extent determined by permanent characteristics (cognitive and non-cognitive skills)
developed during childhood.49 The results in this paper illustrate, however, that stochastic
events also may play a signi￿cant role, setting youths o⁄on a path that leads them to engage
in socially undesirable activities as young adults.
49See Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Cunha and Heckman (2007) for example.
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36Table 1 
 The Relationship of Youth Behaviors and Family Background to Young Adult Incarceration, Crime, and Arrests Rates 
and High School Completion
a  
 Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent 
   Incarcerated  Ages 
19-22 
Commit Crime Ages 
            19-22 
Arrested  Ages 
19-22 
HS Graduate 
Attend School  
at Age 16         
        
No 22.8  16.4  30.6  27.1  6.1 
Yes 77.2  4.0  18.4  11.6  74.3 
Difference -  12.4  12.2  15.5  -68.2 
95% Conf. Int.  -  (6.8,18.0)  (5.6,18.8)  (9.5,21.5)  (-72.2,-64.2) 
          
Work and Attend 
School at Age 16          
No 80.6  4.2  16.4  12.2  73.0 
Yes 19.4  3.5  18.0  7.6  79.9 
Difference -  0.7  -1.6  4.6  -6.9 
95% Conf. Int.  -  (-2.5,3.8)  (-9.0,5.9) (-0.1,9.2)  (-13.8,0.0) 
          
Commit Crime at  
 Age 14         
Yes 26.6  4.1  35.8  19.7  44.3 
No 73.4  3.9  17.1  9.4  63.3 
Difference -  0.2  18.7  10.3  -19.0 
95% Conf. Int.    (-3.8,4.1)  (9.6,27.9)  (3.5,6.6)  (-27.2,-10.8) 
          
Mother High 
School Dropout           
Yes 25.7  9.6  20.6  16.4  37..8 
No 74.3  5.1  20.2  13.1  66.2 
Difference -  4.5  0.4  3.3  -28.4 
95% Conf. Int.  -  (0.1,8.9)  (-5.2,6.0) (-1.5,8.1)  (-35.0,-21.8) 
          
Teen Mother           
Yes 42.3  8.2  20.2  14.2  53.5 
No 57.7  4.6  20.4  14.3  65.0 
Difference -  3.6  -0.2  -0.1  -12.5 
95% Conf. Int.  -  (0.0,7.2)  (-5.4,5.0) (-4.3,4.1)  (-18.7,-6.4) 
          
Always Live in 
Nuclear Family          
No 34.4  8.2  23.6  18.7  54.7 
Yes 65.6  5.4  19.1  12.7  59.7 
Difference -  2.8  4.5  6.0  -5.0 
95% Conf. Int.  -  (-0.8,6.4)  (-0.8,9.8)  (1.5,10.5)  (-11.0,1.0) 
 Table 2 
Model Fit: Estimation Sample 
 In  School  Crime  Arrest  Incarceration  Work 
Age  Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
14  .939 .940 .266 .281 .098 .075 .015 .009 .026 .038 
15  .867 .859 .287 .281 .101 .112 .026 .024 .083 .097 
16  .772 .760 .273 .267 .112 .136 .036 .037 .188 .177 
17  .660 .646 .256 .249 .129 .150 .047 .048 .295 .297 
18  .412 .397 .238 .261 .205 .206 .075 .079 .370 .430 
19  .118 .123 .291 .293 .233 .246 .122 .113 .420 .467 
20  .033 .027 .296 .307 .273 .248 .111 .120 .400 .444 
21  .014 .011 .285 .266 .283 .246 .177 .137 .415 .465 
22  .000 .005 .174 .199 .214 .212 .136 .151 .478 .510 
            
14-18  .742 .751 .266 .268 .124 .129 .038 .035 .190 .187 
19-22  .067 .070 .284 .287 .253 .245 .130 .121 .417 .463 
            
 Table 3 
Model Fit, Ages 19-22 : Out-of-Sample and Combined Samples  
    
 Out-of-Sample  Combined  Samples 
  Actual Predicted Actual Predicted 
      
   Crime  .154  .147  .206  .206 
      
   Arrest  .072  .070  .145  .144 
      
   Incarceration  .019  .018  .064  .062 
      
 Table 4 
Selected Outcomes by Initial Conditions:  Model Predictions 
       
  Type 1  Type 2  Type 3 
 c 13=0 c13=1 c13=0 c13=1 c13=0 c13=1 
       
      HSG  .250 .150 .443 .320 .852 .801 
        
   c19-22 .182 .238 .271 .354 .122 .177 
        
   A19-22 .280 .343 .224 .297 .022 .033 
        
   J19-22 .185 .262 .084 .127 .002 .002 
        
   Percent  12.4  5.2  20.3  9.1  42.3  10.7 
       
c13 = 1 if committed a crime at age 13, = 0 otherwise. 
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Where X = c: crime,  
               = A:  arrest, 
     = J:  incarcerated. 
      
 
         Na =  number of simulations 
     =  10,800 
 
 Table 5 
Effect on Selected Outcomes of Changing Initial Condition 
   
  All Type 3  All c13=0 
   
   ∆ HSG  .238  .038 
    
   ∆ c19-22 -.060 -.021 
    
   ∆ A19-22 -.114 -.019 
    
   ∆ J19-22 -.064 -.012 
    
   
 Table 6 
Selected Correlates of Initial Conditions 
            
           Proportion    of 
 P30  P31  P20  P21  P10  P11  Sample 
            
Overall Proportion  .423  .107  .203  .091  .124  .052  1.00 
            
Mother’s  Schooling            
     < 12  .341  .091  .228  .098  .174  .069  25.7 
      12  .441  .087  .212  .087  .122  .049  42.4 
   13-15  .475  .137  .182  .086  .086  .034  21.5 
   16 +  .523  .167  .136  .070  .071  .033  10.4 
              
Teen Mother               
     Yes  .383  .093  .226  .090  .153  .055  .423 
      No  .464  .114  .188  .086  .101  .046  .577 
              
Always Lived With               
   Both Bio Parents               
     No  .378  .112  .210  .102  .135  .062  .656 
     Yes  .445  .102  .202  .084  .120  .046  .344 
              
Mother’s Schooling <12,  .245  .081  .238  .105  .227  .105  .048 
Teen Mother,               
Not Always Lived with               
    Both Bio Parents               
              
Mother’s Schooling >=16,  .548  .184  .132  .066  .054  .015  .052 
Non-Teen Mother,               
Always Lived with               
    Both Bio Parents               
              
AFQT              
  1
st Quartile  .333  .068  .239  .118  .166  .075  .25 
  2
nd Quartile  .392  .118  .225  .089  .131  .044  .25 
  3
rd Quartile  .502  .109  .180  .070  .102  .037  .25 
  4
th Quartile  .558  .159  .154  .055  .052  .022  .25 
            
 Table 7 
The Effect of Crime, Arrests and Incarceration at Age 14 on Crime and Incarceration Rates at Age 19-22 
          
Type c14 A14 J14   ∆c19-22    ∆J19-22  
  1 0 0    .075      .096   
1 1 1 0    .075      .115   
  1 1 1    .078      .126   
               
  1 0 0    .105      .055   
2 1 1 0    .117      .072   
  1 1 1    .118      .078   
               
  1 0 0    .072      .001   
3 1 1 0    .088      .002   
  1 1 1    -      -   
             
 
∆x19-22 = x19-22 (c14, A14, J14) – x19-2(0, 0, 0); x=c,J. 
 
“-“ indicates too few simulated observations in  (c14, A14, J14). Table 8 
The Effect of Working at Age 16 While Attending School on Crime  and Incarceration Rates at Ages 19-22 
       
Type   ∆c19-22   ∆J19-22   
            
1   .-.045    -.077     
            
2   -.064    -.041     
            
3   -.037    -.001     
             
 
∆X19-22 = X19-22 (s16 =1, h16=1) – X19-22  (s16 =1, h16=0); X=c,J 
s16 = 1 if in school at age 16, h16 = 1 if work at age 16 
s16 = 0, h16 = 0 otherwise Table 9 
The Effect of Not Attending School at Age 16 on Crime and Incarceration Rates at Ages 19-22 
      
Type   ∆c19-22 ∆J19-22   
             
1   .072  .081     
             
2   .127  .056     
             
3   .148  .002     
              
∆X19-22 = X19-22 (s16=0) – X19-22 (s16=1); X=c,J 
s16 = 1 if in school at age 16 
s16 = 0 otherwise Table 10 
 The Importance of Heterogeneity and Classification Error in Estimating the Effect of School Attendance  at 
Age 16 on Young Adult Outcomes 
  Change in Percent Change in Percent  Change in Percent  Change in Percent
 
(s16 = 0) -  (s16 = 1) 
Incarcerated Ages 
19-22 
Commit Crime Ages 
            19-22 
Arrested  Ages 
19-22 
HS Graduate 
       
  Data  12.4 12.2 15.5  -68.2 
  (6.8, 18.0)  (5.6, 18.8)  (9.5, 21.5)  (-64.2, -72.2) 
       
Model Prediction –  
 Not Accounting for 
 Classification Error 
     
               
  No Heterogeneity -  11.5  11.6  16.4  -73.1 
  Exc. Other Outcomes         
       
  No Heterogeneity -      8.4  9.3  13.2  -68.5 
  Inc. Other Outcomes         
       
  Heterogeneity -   2.8  6.6  3.6  -52.9 
  Inc. Other Outcomes         
       
       
Model Prediction –  
 Accounting for 
 Classification Error 
     
       
  No Heterogeneity  12.3  14.4  19.0  -79.6 
  Exc. Other Outcomes         
       
  No Heterogeneity -      8.9  12.0  15.2  -76.0 
  Inc. Other Outcomes         
       
  Heterogeneity  3.4  9.7  6.2  -64.4 
  Inc. Other Outcomes         
       
Weighted Average 
of Heterogeneous 
Effects 
 
3.2   12.9  6.1  -75.4 
 
 Table A.1 
 
VAR Parameter Estimates 
(Asymptotic Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
      
 s a ca Aa Ja ha
Type  3 -0.658 0.645 -2.968 -3.898 -5.538 
  (0.032) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.016) 
Type1-Type3  -1.272  -0.026 1.197 1.538 0.027 
  (0.065) (0.009) (0.064) (0.030) (0.040) 
Type2-Type3 -0.887  -0.152  0.0872  1.002  -0.271 
  (0.030) (0.014) (0.051) (0.040) (0.031) 
sa-1 6.402 -0.495 -0.232 -0.209 0.053 
  (0.037) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) 
ca-1 -0.321  2.160 1.042 0.579 0.172 
  (0.027) (0.029) (0.042) (0.039) (0.007) 
Aa-1 -0.286  -0.030 1.246 1.037 0.068 
  (0.038) (0.009) (0.041) (0.063) (0.133) 
Ja-1 -0.386 -0.314 -0.408  1.147  -1.812 
  (0.081) (0.023) (0.163) (0.067) (0.346) 
ha-1 0.188 -0.193 -0.311 -0.391 3.012 
  (0.033) (0.015) (0.050) (0.099) (0.101) 
A g e        
Spline  1  -0.240  -0.105 0.046 0.032 0.265 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Spline 2  -0.535  -0.007  -0.042  0.021  -0.345 
  (0.112) (0.018) (0.010) (2.322) (0.032) 
Spline 3  -0.149  -0.234  -0.057  0.119  0.272 
  (1.582) (0.012) (0.024) (0.035) (0.229) 
      
Correlation Matrix Parameters 
 s a ca Aa Ja ha
sa 1.000      
      
ca 0.094  1.000     
  (0.009)      
Aa -0.272 0.512  1.000     
 (0.005)  (0.007)      
Ja -0.275  0.236 0.818 1.000   
 (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.005)    
ha -0.248  -0.092 0.116 -0.024 1.000 
  (0.022) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005)   
 
 
 
 
    Table A.1 continued 
      
                                    Type Probability Parameters 
Type  1      
Constant    -1.2251     
   (0.228)      
c13   0.504     
   (0.442)     
Type  2      
Constant    -0.732     
   (0.242)     
c13   0.569     
   (0.426)     
      
                                 Classification Error Parameters 
sa   1.526     
   (0.116)     
ca   1.697     
   (0.128)     
Aa   0.706     
   (0.149)     
Ja   3.089     
   (0.503)     
ha   0.882     
   (0.094)     
      
lnL=-8,550      
      
 Table A.2 
Assessments of Alternative Degrees of Unobserved Heterogeneity 
  No 
Heterogeneity  Two Types  Three Types Four Types  Normal 
Distribution 
Log  Likelihood  -8,654  -8,587 -8,550 -8,540  -8,628 
         
No. of Parameters  60  67  74  81  80 
         
AIC    17,428  17,312 17,258 17,241  17,417 
         
BIC  17,825  17,755 17,748 17,778  17,947 
         
 